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We provide an empirical analysis of host country determinants of Chinese outward FDI for 
the period 2003 to 2008, using data disaggregated by country and industry. We want to assess 
the relevance of market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset seeking motivations 
suggested by the theory on FDI determinants. Our results show that only FDI in 
manufacturing is attracted by market seeking motivations. As expected, resource seeking is an 
important motivation for Chinese FDI in resource related sectors, which usually refers to 
countries with political fragile environments. Strategic asset seeking motivations are relevant 
for both manufacturing and services. 
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After being the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the 
developing countries for over a decade, China recently entered the top 10 ranked 
home economies for FDI (UNCTAD, 2010). From  2000  to 2010, the stock of 
Chinese outward FDI increased from US$4 billion to US$317 billion and total annual 
flows  increased from less than US$1  billion in 2000 to US$68  billion in 2010, 
showing a steady increase since 2008 (MOFCOM, 2011). 
The rapid expansion abroad of Chinese firms has generated worldwide interest, 
concern and controversy. Chinese investments are often viewed with a mixture of 
hope and fear. On the one hand, the input of fresh capital is attractive for host 
countries, especially in the  current period of low growth. Also, in developing 
countries these investments potentially expand the opportunities for technology 
transfer. On the other hand, the Chinese State is often behind FDI and many Chinese 
companies are backed by political and financial support. The rich countries have 
concerns about the exploitative attitude of Chinese investors, and the developed 
countries fear the  loss of key technological capabilities. These mixed feelings, 
however, are often based on scant information and personal opinion; there is an 
urgent need for robust empirical research to provide a better understanding of the 
phenomenon.  
The empirical research on the determinants of outward expansion of Chinese firms is 
based mainly on descriptive evidence (see among others Taylor, 2002; Wong and 
Chan, 2003; Deng, 2003, 2004), on company case studies (see among others Liu and 
Li, 2002; Warner et al, 2004; Zhang and Filippov, 2009), studies of specific host 
countries (e.g. on Germany Schüler-Zhou and Schüller, 2009; on Italy Pietrobelli et 
al., 2011; on the UK Cross and Voss, 2008; Liu and Tian, 2008) and particular industries (i.e. on the automotive sector Amighini and Franco, 2011). A  few 
econometric studies are based on aggregate FDI data (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng 
and Ma, 2008; Cheung and Qian, 2008; Cross et al., 2008; Pradhan, 2009; Kolstad 
and Wiig, 2010), but their results are mixed.  
This paper adds to the empirical literature on the motives of Chinese FDI and extends 
existing work in a number of ways. Our analysis is disaggregated at the industry and 
host country levels, and the period considered is 2003 to 2008, which includes the 
recent and major  wave of foreign expansion by Chinese firms. Industry level 
disaggregation allows account to be taken of the motivations for investing which may 
be different in different industries and sectors. The large share of FDI in resource-
intensive sectors may be undermining the importance given in existing work based 
on aggregate FDI data, to motivations other than resource seeking (Buckley et al., 
2007; Cheung and Qian, 2008; Kolstad and Wiig, 2010).  
The fDi Markets database exploited in this paper registers greenfield investments, 
providing an industry disaggregation on which basis we can investigate the relevance 
of market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset seeking motivations 
(Dunning, 1993) to explain Chinese outward FDI in different groups of countries. 
Our results show that only FDI in manufacturing is based on  market seeking 
motivations.  Resource seeking is an important motivation for Chinese FDI in 
resource related sectors, generally in countries with politically fragile environments. 
Strategic asset seeking motivations apply to investment in both manufacturing and 
services.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
determinants of Chinese FDI and presents the derived research hypotheses. Section 3 
provides a detailed description of the geographic and sectoral distribution of Chinese outward FDI from 2003  to  2008. Section 4  presents the empirical findings  and 
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The determinants of FDI on Chinese outward investments 
2.1. The literature 
The literature on host country determinants of FDI traditionally has  focused on 
investments by developed countries, reflecting their larger share in international FDI 
flows.  
A popular typology that takes account of the different motivations for outward FDI is 
provided in Dunning (1993) and is based on four categories: a) market-seeking 
investment aimed at entering new markets; b) resource-seeking investment aimed at 
searching for resources found in specific foreign locations (e.g. specific  natural 
resources); c) strategic asset-seeking investment aimed at augmenting the set of the 
firm’s  proprietary resources;  and d) efficiency-seeking  investment  within  a cost 
reduction strategy.  
This typology is used in some of the empirical studies on host country determinants 
of Chinese FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng and Ma, 2008; Cheung and Qian, 2008; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2010), which mainly focus on the significance of the first three of 
Dunning’s categories, the last so far being  considered relatively unimportant for 
Chinese multinational companies (MNCs), because of the relatively low costs of 
domestic labour and other inputs (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Many existing studies stress the peculiarity of Chinese MNC, which predominantly 
are state-owned enterprises and whose investment decisions, therefore, may reflect 
political objectives not necessarily consistent with the profit-maximizing strategies of 
private companies. This implies that their determinants may be different from those 
of  any other country (Morck et al.,  2008; Yeung and  Liu, 2008).  Also, Chinese outward  FDI might follow a different pattern to  FDI from developed countries 
because of the peculiarity of China’s institutional environment, which may represent 
advantage for Chinese companies investing in developing countries (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Quer et al., 2011). 
So far,  empirical studies of  the determinants of Chinese outward FDI provide 
evidence favouring a number of factors that significantly affect the likelihood of a 
country  to be chosen as a location for FDI. Some of these factors support the 
conventional knowledge in the international business literature, based on widespread 
evidence on the choice of FDI locations by multinational firms from a large number 
of industrialized countries. In fact, the empirical evidence provides support for 
market seeking motivations  that attract  Chinese firms to invest especially in the 
OECD countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2008; Kolstad and Wiig, 
2010) and for resource seeking motivations in non-OECD countries (Pradhan, 2009; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2010; Sanfilippo, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007).  
Some other findings point to results that would seem to be peculiar to the case of 
China. For instance, contrary to the results in the literature on FDI from developed 
economies (Faeth, 2009), Chinese FDI seems to be attracted to destinations with high 
political and economic risks (Kolstad and Wiig, 2010; Buckley et al., 2007; Quer et 
al., 2011). Also, cultural factors, including the exploitation of relational assets when 
operating in countries with very different institutional settings, have been identified 
as being among the determinants of Chinese outward FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Cheng and Ma, 2008).  
Finally, and again rather surprisingly, there is no evidence in existing empirical work 
of strategic asset-seeking motivations, which some qualitative studies on Chinese 
FDI in Europe stress (Cross and Voss, 2008; Liu and Tian, 2008; Pietrobelli et al., 
2011), especially relation to the white goods sector (Bonaglia et al., 2007) and well known Chinese MNCs such as Haier, Lenovo, BOE and TCL (Li, 2007; Liu and 
Buck, 2009).  According to these studies, Chinese companies invest abroad as a 
means of rapidly overcoming their disadvantages in terms of technology, knowledge 
and skills, to acquire brands, new and advanced management skills and to tap into 
pools of local knowledge (Amighini et al., 2010; Hong and Sun, 2006; Luo et al., 
2010). This is also a declared aim of state-directed Chinese FDI (Deng, 2009).  
In this paper, we explore the determinants of Chinese FDI at sectoral level using a 
different database. We conduct an analysis disaggregated by sector and country over 
the period 2003 to 2008. The sectoral disaggregation is a major contribution because 
it allows us to identify the determinants of Chinese FDI relevant to specific industries 
and countries, not possible in existing work using aggregated databases. 
In the next section, we present our literature derived hypotheses, which we will test 
in the econometric analysis. 
 
2.2.  The hypotheses 
There is a large body of evidence confirming that Chinese FDI are based on market-
seeking motivations, a result that is in line with traditional FDI theory. A number of 
studies find that market size is positively and significantly related to Chinese FDI 
(see Buckley et al. (2007) on approved Chinese FDI
1 to 49 countries for the period 
1984-2001; Cheung and Qian (2008) on approved Chinese FDI to 31 countries from 
1991 to 2005; Cheng and Ma (2008) on actual Chinese FDI to 90 host countries in 
2003 to 2006. Using UNCTAD data for 104 countries over the period 2003-2006, 
Kolstad and Wiig (2010) confirm this finding although when the sample is split into 
                                                 
1These MOFCOM data underestimate the real value of investments because they do not include the 
financial sector up to 2006 and are based on the value arising from approval procedures rather than the 
effective value of bids (thereby  excluding non-approved investments and private transactions not 
formally recorded). In addition, these data take no account of investments channeled via offshore 
destinations (such as the Cayman and Virgin Islands) or financial centers (Hong Kong) and thus not 
officially recorded in Chinese balance of payment records.  
 OECD (25) and non-OECD  countries  (79), GDP is significant only  for OECD 
countries not non-OECD ones.  
In our model, GDP is used as a measure of the absolute market size of the host 
country (Frankel and Wei, 1996; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; 
Dunning, 1993). In line with the literature, we expect a positive relationship between 
Chinese FDI and market size. 
In relation to the market-seeking hypothesis, our specification includes Chinese 
exports to and imports from host countries  in the same sector.
2 With regard to 
exports, some studies point out that Chinese FDI is defensive (i.e. it follow exports) 
because firms set up foreign affiliates in order better to serve their customers and 
increase customer loyalty (Buckley et al., 2007). However, it is also possible that 
FDI substitutes for exports; this happens if investments are used as a springboard to 
leap trade barriers (Dasgupta, 2008; Luo and Tung, 2007). 
China’s imports from host countries also capture the intensity of trade relations. On 
the one hand, we could hypothesize that Chinese companies want to internalize these 
strategic flows through FDI abroad, in which case the expected sign will be positive 
(Buckely and Casson, 1976). On the other hand, the relationship between Chinese 
imports and FDI might be negative (Buckley et al., 2007) if Chinese firms relocate 
their processing activities abroad through FDI, which is common for tariff jumping 
investments, a modality adopted widely  by Chinese companies in developing 
countries (OECD, 2008). Thus, given that the relationship between exports, imports 
and FDI could be positive or negative, we leave our prediction open. 
In relation to exports and imports, we include distance from the home country as a 
proxy for trade costs. Conventional theory suggests that firms are more likely to 
                                                 
2Each bilateral investment flow is matched to the corresponding bilateral export and import flows 
between  the home country (in our case, China), and the recipient countries,  according to the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 3. 
 invest in FDI in more distant markets (Buckley and Casson, 1981; Barba Navaretti 
and  Venables, 2004). The  gravity model, however, predicts that  the relationship 
could also be negative since the cost of investing increases with distance (Kolstad 
and Wiig, 2010; Pradhan, 2009); hence we leave this prediction open. 
With regard to resource-seeking motivations, several empirical studies on Chinese 
FDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung and Qian, 2008; Kolstad and Wiig, 2010; 
Sanfilippo, 2010; Pradhan, 2009) show that Chinese investments are motivated 
strongly by the need to satisfy growing demand for primary resources and this is true 
especially for investments going to developing countries. As a  proxy for natural 
resources, our model includes variables for the share of fuels and the share of ores 
and metals in total merchandise exports by the host economy (Pradhan, 2009). For 
both variables, the expected signs are positive. 
In relation to strategic asset seeking motivations, the proxy used in some studies is 
number of patents registered by the host country, which Buckley et al. (2007) and 
Kolstad and Wiig (2010) find to be not significant. In the present paper, we use gross 
secondary school enrolment as a proxy for the level of human capital. According to 
Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001), the level of human capital is a statistically significant 
determinant of FDI inflows.  Our expectation is that the availability of a literate 
labour force has a positive impact on the location choice of Chinese companies that 
want to upgrade their capabilities.  
To test the strategic resource-seeking hypothesis, we also  introduce a dummy 
variable for those countries that spend more than 1% of their GDP on research and 
development (R&D). Following work based mainly on case studies, which shows 
increasing interest among Chinese companies to invest in countries with advanced 
R&D capacities, with the aim of acquiring technological capabilities (Di Minin and Zhang, 2008; Pietrobelli et al.,  2011),  we would expect a positive relationship 
between R&D in the host country and FDI. 
In line with the existing literature, we also include a number of control variables that 
have been found to be significant in previous studies of the host country determinants 
of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001; Blonigen, 2005).  
Inflation, measured as the annual change in the consumer price index, is a standard 
indicator of macroeconomic instability (Asiedu, 2002). Unstable economic 
conditions and poor fundamentals, especially in developing countries, reduce the 
attraction  of potential host markets  by negatively affecting profit expectations. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Chinese FDI, Buckley et al. (2007) find a positive and 
significant association between inflation and FDI, explaining this result as being due 
to the unusual tolerance of Chinese companies towards unstable countries. Given 
these mixed results, we leave this prediction open. 
Another important dimension of instability is represented by the political risks 
connected to the host country. In the conventional theory on FDI, high political risk 
is usually associated with low levels of attraction  for  FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001). 
However, the empirical literature on emerging MNCs shows that they are relatively 
indifferent to the institutional conditions in host countries and, according to some 
authors, these contexts even represent a comparative advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008). This  would seem to apply to the case of China.  Chinese FDI are 
attracted to countries with poor public institutions (i.e. high political risk), a result 
first documented by Buckley et al. (2007) and recently confirmed by Quer et al. 
(2011), using company level data. Kolstad and Wiig (2010) provide further support 
for this finding, pointing to poor institutions as attractors for Chinese firms investing 
abroad in natural resources. In their study, the interaction effect between institutions 
and natural resources abundance is significant and positive, showing that Chinese FDI in non-OECD countries are based more on natural resources abundance than the 
institutional environment of the host country. This finding shows that Chinese FDI 
are attracted by  countries with poor institutions because rents are  more easily 
appropriated in institutionally weak environments.  
In order to assess how risk influences  Chinese FDI, our specification includes a 
variable from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), which is a measure of the 
”perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests”.
3 This variable represents an important dimension of a 
country’s political weakness and varies from -2.5 to 2.5, the lower value representing 
the worst performance (Kaufmann et al., 2009). The prediction again is open. 
Finally, in line with the literature, we include the number of telephone mainlines to 
indicate the availability of infrastructures and communication facilities in the host 
country. Good infrastructure facilitates flows of goods and information and creates 
an environment conductive to knowledge spillovers.
4 Given that a well-developed 
network of infrastructures generally  encourages investment, the expected sign is 
positive (Khadaroo and Seetanah, 2007). 
Table 1 presents the variables included in our specification; Table 2 reports some 
descriptive statistics. The correlation matrix is presented in Table A  in the 
Appendix.
5 
Tables 1 and 2 here 
 
                                                 
3 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf 
4In principle, other measures of infrastructural endowments might be better for our analysis. We might 
expect that FDI in different sectors would  be attracted to countries with different types of 
infrastructure.  E.g., FDI in service sectors is likely to be  oriented  more to countries with good 
communications facilities; FDI in manufacturing is likely to be oriented to countries with good rail or 
road provision. However telephone mainlines is the only variable available for the whole sample of 
countries. 
5 The variance inflation factor (VIF) was computed after running a pooled regression, and does not 
suggest the presence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  3. Chinese FDI: A descriptive overview  
 
In this paper, data on FDI are from fDi Markets, an online database maintained by 
fDi Intelligence, a specialist division of the Financial Times, which monitors cross 
border greenfield investments, covering all sectors and countries worldwide since 
2003.  Only projects creating new jobs and investments (no minimum investment 
required) are included:  mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and other equity 
investments are not included.
6  Therefore, our database covers  the number of 
investments undertaken by Chinese companies in each country and each industry in 
the period 2003 to 2008. The advantage of this dataset with respect to MOFCOM and 
UNCTAD data is the availability of a sectoral classification for  each investment 
project, aligned to the industrial classifications adopted at international level. The 
dataset contains information on countries of origin and destination of investments, 
and provides other relevant information, such as year of investment, employment, 
sector and business activity undertaken by the foreign affiliate. 
Based on the World Bank classification for year 2006, host countries are aggregated 
in three groups based on their income level: (a) high income countries, which include 
the OECD and other high income countries (such as the Asian tigers and the oil rich 
Gulf states);
7 (b) upper middle income countries; (c) lower middle and low income 
countries (see Table A in the Appendix for the  list of countries in each group). 
Regarding industry classification, we consider three sectors: manufacturing, resource 
intensive and services.
8 The dataset also provides a disaggregation according to the 
                                                 
6 This is an important difference from the FDI data provided by MOFCOM which does include M&A 
and equity investments.  
7 Within high-income countries we identify the sub-group of OECD countries because this eliminates 
possible biases due to the presence in the first group of countries such as Hong Kong and the Gulf 
states.  
8 The resource intensive  sector includes the two digit  ISIC level  (rev. 3)  between 1 and 14; 
manufacturing includes sector  codes 15 to  37; services includes 40 to 90 (see Table B in the 
Appendix). business activity performed: production, trade-related services such as retail or sales, 
marketing and after-sales support and all the other services subsumed in business 
services.  
According to these data, there were 925 Chinese greenfield investments in the period 
2003-2008. Compared to other Asian developing economies, China is ranked second, 
after India (with 1,438 FDI). The annual distribution of Chinese FDI grew rapidly 
after 2006. In terms of geographic distributions, Chinese FDI include 110 countries, 
developed, developing and transition economies (Table 1). Around 20 per cent total 
Chinese FDI went to other Asian economies (excluding Hong Kong), especially 
India (5.8%) and Vietnam (4.9%). USA and Russia are the largest recipient countries 
outside Asia, with respectively 7 per cent and 5 per cent of total Chinese FDI since 
2003.
9 Table 3 shows that Chinese FDI are concentrated in a few countries with the 
top five recipients accounting for almost 30 per cent and the top 10 recipients for 
almost 40 per cent of total Chinese FDI. In relation to the distribution of the host 
countries by income level, almost half of Chinese FDI go to high income countries 
and the group receiving the second largest share is the low and lower-middle income 
countries (38%), followed by upper-middle income countries (14%).  
Table 3 here 
For sectoral distribution, overall, 54 per cent of Chinese FDI is in the manufacturing 
sector, 36 per cent in services and 10 per cent in resource-intensive sectors. The most 
attractive sectors seem to be Communications, Metals and Coal, Oil and Natural Gas, 
and Chinese firms have massively expanded their presence abroad to secure access to 
                                                 
9The list of recipients in terms of number of investments (Table 3) differs from the major recipients of 
FDI outflows provided by MOFCOM (2011). The list of official destination is biased by the practice 
of round tripping, i.e. the channeling of large investment outflows to tax havens (such as the Cayman 
or Virgin islands) or financial centres (i.e. Hong Kong) to establish special purpose entities that 
reinvest capital in China or elsewhere (Morck et al., 2008; Davies, 2010; Sutherland and Ning, 2011). 
The discrepancy between the official data and the data in Table 3 could be due to the “inherent 
secrecy” of tax havens and the resulting difficulties related to disclosing information about which 
Chinese firms have investments there (Sutherland et al., 2010), and to the fact that most investments to 
financial offshore centres, such as Hong Kong, are M&A (Davies, 2010). energy and other resources, which accounts for more than 17 per cent of total FDI 
(Table 4). The automotive industry accounts for almost 9 per cent of total Chinese 
FDI, with the remaining sectors attracting minor shares of investment. 
Table 4 here 
Taking account of the cross-classification of FDI by host country and sector, Table 5 
presents Chinese FDI by level of host country income based on the World Bank 
definition,  and by sector groups. As already  stressed (Buckley et al.,  2007), 
manufacturing and service sector investment is generally in high income countries, 
while investment in resource intensive sectors is usually in low and lower–middle 
income countries. Table 5(b) shows that in high income countries investments in 
service sectors  dominate, in the upper-middle income most FDI is in the 
manufacturing sectors, and in the low income group the shares of manufacturing and 
resource intensive sector investments are very similar. 
If we look at the disaggregation by business activities, the most frequent is 
production, followed by trade related activities and business services (Table 6).  
Tables 5 and 6 here 
To conclude our descriptive analysis of the database, Table 7 presents a comparison 
of country destinations, among China and Brazil, Russia and India. If we compare 
China with the rest of the world, Chinese outward FDI goes relatively more to low 
and lower-middle income countries than the average (38%vs. 21%) and this applies 
to India and Russia, but not Brazil. Compared to the world average, Chinese FDI in 
resource-intensive sectors is less likely to go to high-income countries (19% 
compared to a world average of 36$) and is much more attracted to low income 
countries than the world average (57%compared to a world average of 34%). It 
should be noted that this applies also to the other largest emerging economies of Brazil, India and Russia, whose outward natural resources investments are generally 
to low income rather than high income countries.  
Table 7 here 
 
4. The empirical analysis 
4.1  The model specification 
The  econometric  analysis  is based on a panel dataset of  the number of Chinese 
investments in the host country i and in each industry j at time t. The total number of 
observation is 613, covering 81 countries i, 29 industries j over 6 years t.
10 Since in 
many cases there are no observations for a given country/industry investment in a 
given year, the panel is unbalanced. Our empirical strategy consists of estimating a 
probit model, which measures the partial effect of each explanatory variable on the 
response probability function, represented by a binary formulation of the dependent 
variable assuming the following values:
11 
     
  (1) 
Given that the pooled version of this model assumes independence over i, j and t, 
which, in turn, leads to potential loss of efficiency, the cross-country time-series 
structure of the  dataset is accommodated by employing a random effects probit 
model
12, which can be generalized as follows:  
          (2) 
where  X  is  the  vector  of  explanatory  factors,  β  the  vector  of  the  coefficients 
associated with X, α is the vector of the individual (country) specific unobservable 
                                                 
10 Some countries were  dropped  from the original dataset because of the unavailability of some 
independent variables.  
11A binary response model also reduces the risk of measurement error because in some cases the 
information provided on investment flows is an estimation.  
12 For an application of this method to the study of FDI determinants, see Altomonte (2000) and 
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assumes that there is a constant correlation between the observations within the same 
group (in this case countries) and that the individual effects are normally distributed 
and are uncorrelated with the random error term and with the X.
13 




4.2 The results 
The empirical estimation findings are presented in three tables, one for each sector 
(i.e. manufacturing, resources, services), and include a disaggregation of the host 
countries by income level. 
Table 8 shows the results for the host country determinants of Chinese outward FDI 
in the manufacturing industry. The model confirms the market-seeking hypothesis 
for the whole sample (Column I), in the sub-group of high-income countries (II) and 
in the OECD group (III). This is an interesting result which adds insights to the 
existing evidence because it clarifies that Chinese FDI are based on market seeking 
motivations  only in relation to  rich countries but not middle and low income 
countries (Columns IV and V). 
Table 8 here 
Related to the market-seeking hypothesis, Chinese FDI in the manufacturing industry 
are also positively associated with exports. This result confirms at all income levels 
the studies at the aggregate level (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007; Pradhan, 2009) and 
indicates the importance of Chinese FDI following trade and going to countries to 
which China already exports.  
                                                 
13A random effect probit also assumes equicorrelation between successive disturbances belonging to 
the same individual (Baltagi, 2005). 
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) , , | 1 Pr( α αIt is interesting that the result for the variable measuring the bilateral distance 
between China and the host country complements the previous result and stresses the 
importance of greenfield investments substituting for exports in middle income 
countries (IV) and in production activities (VI) when trade costs increase.  
For imports, the only significant (and negative) coefficient is for FDI in production 
activities (VI). Following Buckley et al. (2007), this can be explained by a decrease 
in the imports of intermediate products when Chinese firms relocate their production 
abroad via FDI. 
To test the resource seeking motivation, the share of fuels in total export (FUELEX) 
is significant with a negative sign only in the general model (I). This hypothesis is 
discussed in more detail in the section of the results for investments in resource 
intensive sectors. 
An interesting and original finding is related to strategic asset-seeking motives. We 
find that the availability of skilled human capital is positively associated with the 
probability of Chinese investment in the manufacturing sectors of high and middle-
income countries (II, III and IV). We also find a positive and significant coefficient 
of  R&D expenditures in the subgroup of OECD countries (III). These  findings 
highlight the importance of the strategic asset-seeking motivation of Chinese 
investment in developed countries, hypothesized in a number of qualitative studies 
(among others Bonaglia et al., 2007; Cross and Voss, 2008; Li, 2007; Liu and Buck, 
2009; Luo et al., 2010; Pietrobelli et al.,  2011),  but not  confirmed  by previous 
econometric analyses. 
For the remaining control variables, the endowment of infrastructures matters for the 
probability for high income countries receiving  Chinese FDI in manufacturing 
sectors, but this does not apply to other country groups, which suggests that lack of infrastructures,  often considered an impediment to inward FDI in low income 
countries, does not seem to be a barrier to Chinese FDI.  
With respect to risk, the results are mixed. Inflation, a measure of macroeconomic 
risk, has a deterrent effect on Chinese FDI for the whole sample (I), meaning that 
Chinese investors tend not to invest in unstable countries. However, the impact of 
corruption on the probability of becoming a recipient of Chinese  FDI varies 
according to the group of countries considered. In high-income countries, Chinese 
investments are negatively associated with  corruption, while in low-income 
economies the opposite is true. In this latter case, this is further confirmation of the 
existing empirical evidence (Kolstad and Wiig, 2010; Quer et al., 2011), and shows 
that in low income countries, Chinese companies invest in countries with fragile 
political environments when seeking natural resources but also in manufacturing. 
Table 9 presents the results of the  model for investment in resource intensive 
sectors.
14 As expected, natural resources endowment (FUELEX)  positively and 
significantly affects Chinese FDI for the whole sample (I) confirming the natural 
resources  seeking motivation. The coefficient is positive and significant for 
investment in high-income countries, which includes the Gulf states.
15 
Table 9 here 
For the perceived level of corruption in the host country, the coefficient is negative 
and significant for the low-income countries, a result that is consistent with previous 
econometric analyses (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2010). This has been 
explained as the preference of multinational firms to locate in countries with a 
similar business environment to their home country. It might also be that Chinese 
firms prefer to locate in countries with high levels of corruption because the rents 
                                                 
14 Due to the small number of investments in the resource sectors of OECD and middle-income 
countries, the model for these two groups does not converge. 
15 The not significant coefficient for low-income countries can be explained by the fact that most of 
these countries are resource rich countries and there is insufficient variation within this group. from natural resource exploitation are more easily captured in such countries. 
However, we should take into account that natural resource rich countries tend to fare 
rather badly for transparency of their economic environments (Collier et al., 2004), 
so the positive correlation between corruption and Chinese FDI might simply be the 
result of a preference for locating in countries with high resource abundance, which 
also tend to be characterized by high levels of corruption. Note, that this result holds 
only for low-income countries, and a more conventional result might be obtained for 
high-income countries, that is,  that  countries with lower corruption levels are 
preferred. 
In relation to infrastructure, the coefficient (TEL) is negative and significant for the 
group of low-income countries, a result that is consistent with other studies (Asiedu, 
2002). It can be explained by the widespread location of natural resources oriented 
investments in remote areas with little basic infrastructure.  
The negative sign of the coefficient of market size means that investments in natural 
resources sectors are more likely to go to low-income countries (and to those with the 
smallest markets). 
Finally,  the coefficients of exports and imports are the reverse of those for the 
manufacturing sector. The positive coefficient of imports shows that the probability 
of a country receiving FDI from China in the resource intensive sectors is higher for 
those countries already exporting to China from the same sector. This suggests that 
Chinese FDI is  aimed  at internalizing these  resources through investment in 
extraction facilities. There is also evidence of a negative impact of Chinese exports 
of natural resources on the likelihood that the importing country will be chosen as a 
location for Chinese FDI in the natural resources sectors.  
Table 10 reports the  results for the  service sectors. An interesting finding  is the 
positive and significant sign of the coefficient of telephone mainlines for the higher income countries, showing a propensity to invest when basic infrastructures are well 
established. The opposite is true for the group of lower income countries, where 
Chinese companies are currently  heavily involved in the construction of basic 
infrastructures, as showed by their large investments in telecommunications in Africa 
(Sanfilippo, 2010).  
Table 10 here 
Also of interest is the positive coefficients of size of R&D spending and level of 
human capital in the OECD countries. This result is confirmed by the significant and 
positive sign of R&D in Column VII, showing that when investing in non-trade 
related services,  including communications, business services and  IT services, 
Chinese companies prefer to invest in countries with good technological capability. 
With regard to trade, overall, FDI in services is a substitute for exports, that is, FDI 
and exports are alternative forms of internationalization for Chinese firms. However, 
for  the  OECD countries, Chinese FDI is  driven by the need to support exports 
through the establishment of distribution networks, customer and marketing centres 
abroad. This seems to be consistent with the results for manufacturing  of 
complementarity between FDI and exports, which reinforces  the market-seeking 
motivation. This result also holds if the analysis is limited to investments in trade 
services (Column VI).  
We find that Chinese FDI in services is negatively affected by distance from the host 
economy. This could indicate that cultural factors and geographical proximity matter 
for the attractiveness of investment destinations, especially in relation to intra-
regional FDI, similar to the results of other studies  on  emerging market 
multinationals (Amighini et al., 2010). 
Finally, the significant and negative sign of the corruption coefficient shows that 
similar to the other two sector groups, a stable political situation does not matter for investment in lower income countries. However, the negative sign of the coefficient 
of inflation indicates that macroeconomic instability is a deterrent to Chinese 
investments in services.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
We have investigated the host country factors affecting the probability of receiving 
Chinese  FDI.  We relied on a dataset  on  bilateral  greenfield  FDI by sector  to 
disentangle the impact of different factors on various groups of sectors and countries 
to assess the nature of Chinese FDI in terms of the  motivations  of  firms, 
distinguishing between market seeking, resource seeking and strategic asset seeking 
motives. Table 11 presents a summary of the main findings. 
With regard to the market seeking motivation, this is clearly relevant for the 
manufacturing sectors with Chinese companies choosing to locate in countries with 
large markets. The opposite would seem to be true for investments in the resource-
intensive sectors, which tend to go to countries with low levels of GDP, especially 
among the group of lower income countries.  
We tested for the relationship between trade flows between China and host countries, 
and the probability of being chosen as a location by Chinese firms. Overall, Chinese 
firms tend to invest abroad through FDI to support their export activities, thus, the 
relationship  is  complementary  rather than a substitute for exports. In resource 
intensive sectors, the complementarity between imports and FDI suggests that 
Chinese firms invest abroad to internalize the benefits from resource extraction. 
Table 11 here 
In terms of resource-seeking motivations, we found, as expected, that they are 
relevant for Chinese FDI in resource-intensive sectors, but not in other sector groups. Relatedly, corruption levels in host countries do not deter Chinese firms investing in 
natural resources. It is interesting that this result holds for all sector groups not just 
the resource intensive sectors. Our results for macroeconomic risk are mixed. As 
would be expected, economically unstable countries are not the favourite destinations 
for FDI, but this is true in the case of China, only for the resource intensive and 
service sectors, not the manufacturing sectors, a controversial result that confirms 
previous findings by Buckley et al. (2007). 
Finally, in the  manufacturing and services sectors Chinese FDI in high income 
countries are based on strategic asset seeking motivations, especially countries with 
high R&D and human capital endowments. This finding adds to our understanding of 
Chinese FDI, since previous studies undertaken on aggregate databases do not 
capture it.  
Overall, our results suggest that the factors increasing the probability of a country’s 
being chosen as a location for Chinese FDI differ between high income and low-
income countries, as do the motivations of investing firms. Also, investment from 
China is driven by different motivations in different sectors. The sectoral 
disaggregation allows us to confirm the strategic asset seeking motivation in 
investments to OECD countries, which is stressed in several case studies, but not 
confirmed econometrically.  
Our results confirm the peculiarity of Chinese FDI with respect to FDI from other 
regions. To what extent our results apply only to Chinese FDI or can be generalized 
to FDI from other emerging economies is an interesting avenue for further research. 
The main limitations of the paper are related to the fact that our dataset includes only 
greenfield investments. Greenfield investments are used mostly to establish 
productive plants or small scale activities, while M&As are increasingly used by 
Chinese firms to target strategic assets in OECD markets and in big deals in the resources sectors. For a broader understanding of the determinants of Chinese firms 
investing abroad, the results in this paper should be complemented by an analysis of 
Chinese foreign investment through M&As.  
Studies of Chinese FDI are in their infancy and would benefit from greater efforts to 
improve data availability. 
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Table A Correlation Matrix  
 
   limp_value  lex_value  lgdp  ldist  fuelex  ormetex  rd  infl  sec_edu  corr  tel 
limp_value  1                     
lex_value  0.829  1                   
lgdp  0.1563  0.1015  1                 
ldist  0.0704  0.0669  0.192  1               
fuelex  -0.0178  -0.0776  -0.1772  0.1015  1             
ormetex  -0.0732  -0.0774  -0.334  0.2064  -0.0805  1           
rd  0.1025  0.0549  0.6532  0.1801  -0.144  -0.1815  1         
infl  -0.0974  -0.0556  -0.3328  0.1178  0.3829  0.2098  -0.3464  1       
sec_edu  0.11  0.0481  0.473  0.2201  -0.1288  -0.138  0.5567  -0.3246  1     
corr  0.0574  0.0219  0.5101  0.1286  -0.4438  -0.1502  0.6869  -0.5782  0.5914  1   
tel  0.0426  0.0144  0.5975  0.0781  -0.3092  -0.2669  0.7572  -0.4827  0.6535  0.8563  1 
 
Table B List of countries in the sample by income level 
High income  Middle up income  Middle low income  Low income 
Australia (OECD)  Argentina  Angola  Afghanistan 
Austria (OECD)  Chile  Armenia  Bangladesh 
Bahrain  Costa Rica  Azerbaijan  Cambodia 
Belgium (OECD)  Croatia  Belarus  Chad 
Canada (OECD)  Czech Republic  Bolivia  Democratic Republic of Congo 
Denmark (OECD)  Gabon  Brazil  Ethiopia 
France (OECD)  Hungary  Bulgaria  Ghana 
Germany (OECD)  Latvia  Cameroon  India 
Greece (OECD)  Malaysia  Colombia  Kenya 
Hong Kong  Mexico  Ecuador  Kyrgyzstan 
Ireland (OECD)  Oman  Egypt  Laos 
Israel  Poland  Georgia  Liberia 
Italy (OECD)  Romania  Guyana  Madagascar 
Japan (OECD)  Russia  Indonesia  Mongolia 
Luxembourg (OECD)  Slovakia  Iran  Mozambique 
Macau  South Africa  Jordan  Myanmar 
Netherlands (OECD)  Turkey  Kazakhstan  Niger 
New Zealand (OECD)  Uruguay  Micronesia  Nigeria 
Norway (OECD)  Venezuela  Morocco  North Korea 
Portugal (OECD)    Peru  Pakistan 
Qatar    Philippines  Papua New Guinea 
Saudi Arabia    Syria  Rwanda 
Singapore    Thailand  Senegal 
South Korea (OECD)    Turkmenistan  Sudan 
Spain (OECD)    Ukraine  Tajikistan 
Sweden (OECD)      Tanzania 
Switzerland (OECD)      Uganda 
United Arab Emirates      Uzbekistan 
UK (OECD)      Vietnam 
USA (OECD)      Yemen 
      Zambia 




Table C List of sectors in the sample by main groups 
Resources  Manufacturing  Services 
       
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas  Aerospace  Alternative/Renewable energy 
Metals (Extraction)  Automotive Components  Business Services 
Minerals  Automotive OEM  Communications 
  Beverages  Financial Services 
  Biotechnology  Healthcare 
  Building & Construction Materials  Hotels and Tourism 
  Business Machinery & Equipment  Leisure & Entertainment 
  Ceramics & Glass  Real Estate 
  Chemicals  Software & IT services 
  Consumer Electronics  Space & Defence 
  Consumer Products  Transportation 
  Electronic Components  Warehousing & Storage 
  Engines & Turbines   
  Food & Tobacco   
 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & 
Tools   
  Medical Devices   
 
Metals and Minerals 
(Manufacturing of)   
  Non-Automotive Transport OEM   
  Paper, Printing & Packaging   
  Pharmaceuticals   
  Plastics   
  Semiconductors   
  Textiles   
  Wood Products   
 Table 1 Variable list and description* 
Variable  Description  Source 
GDP  Log of host country GDP 
World Development 
Indicators 
IMP  Log of imports 
UN Comtrade (accessed via 
WITS) 
EXP  Log of exports 
UN Comtrade (accessed via 
WITS) 
DIST 
Log of simple distance (most 
populated cities, in Km)  CEPII 









SEC_EDU  Secondary gross enrolment rate 
World Development 
Indicators and UNESCO 
R&D 
Dummy, 1 if R&D expenditures on 
GDP more than 1%  UNESCO 
TEL  Telephone mainlines per 1,000 people 
World Development 
Indicators 
INFL  Inflation, % consumer price index 
World Development 
Indicators 
CORR  Perception of corruption 
World Governance 
Indicators 
* All the monetary variables are in constant dollars (2000=100). 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP  683  26.495  1.955  19.257  30.220 
IMP  686  10.375  12.202  -8.459  24.114 
EXP  686  11.541  12.682  -8.459  24.328 
DIST  686  8.704  0.631  6.696  9.868 
FUELEX  619  17.252  23.407  0  98.028 
ORMETEX  644  6.619  11.739  0.003  85.372 
SEC_EDU  686  84.680  24.955  6  160.347 
R&D  686  0.415  0.493  0  1 
TEL  684  30.505  20.886  0.053  66.438 
INFL  662  6.729  17.579  -2.539  431.700 
CORR   686  0.393  1.129  -1.693  2.390 
 Table 3 Geographical distribution of Chinese outward FDI flows, 2003-2008 
Top recipients  No.  % on total 
USA  65  7.0 
India  54  5.8 
Viet Nam  45  4.9 
Russia  44  4.8 
Hong Kong  44  4.8 
Brazil  24  2.6 
Indonesia  23  2.5 
Philippines  21  2.3 
Thailand  19  2.1 
Australia  15  1.6 
Pakistan  13  1.4 
Mexico  12  1.3 
Iran  10  1.1 
Total  925  100.0 
of which:     
High income*  439  48 
Upper middle income*  133  14 
Low and lower middle income*  353  38 
*Countries are classified according to the World Bank definition. 
Source: FDIMarkets.com 
   Table 4 Sectoral distribution of Chinese outward FDI, 2003-2008 
Sector  No.  % of total 
Communications  118  12.8 
Metals  100  10.8 
Automotive industry  81  8.8 
Financial Services  74  8.0 
Consumer Electronics  59  6.4 
Coal, Oil and Natural Gas  58  6.3 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & 
Tools  53  5.7 
Alternative/Renewable energy  21  2.3 
Chemicals  17  1.8 
Transportation  14  1.5 
Building & Construction Materials  14  1.5 
Other sectors  316  34.1 
Total  925  100 
of which:     
Manufacturing sectors*  499  54 
Resource intensive sectors*  96  10 
Services sectors*  330  36 
*See Table B in the Appendix. 
Source: Authors’ computations on FDIMarkets.com 
 
    
Table 5 Chinese number of outward FDI by sector groups and host country’s income level*, 
2003-2008 
(a)      Sector groups     
Host Countries  Manufacturing  Resources  Services  All 
Sectors 
High income  47%  19%  61%  48% 
Upper-middle income  20%  24%  15%  14% 
Low and lower-middle 
income 
33%  57%  23%  38% 
Total   100%  100%  100%   
 
(b) 
   
Sector groups 
   
Host Countries  Manufacturin
g 
Resources  Services  Total 
High income  37%  12%  51%  100% 
Upper-middle income  50%  16%  35%  100% 
Low and lower-middle 
income 
39%  38%  24%  100% 
All Countries  54%  10%  36%   
Source: FDIMarkets.com 
Table 6 Chinese outward FDI by business activity performed by foreign affiliates, 2003-2008 




Manufacturing  328  35.5 
Sales, Marketing & Support  209  22.6 
Business Services  92  9.9 
Construction  17  1.8 
Extraction  57  6.2 
ICT & Internet Infrastructure  15  1.6 
Logistics, Distribution & 
Transportation  30  3.2 
Electricity  19  2.1 
Total  925  100.0 
Source: Authors’ computations on FDIMarkets.com Table 7 BRIC countries’ outward FDI by income-level of recipient countries, 2003-2008 
Income level of recipient countries   
  Low and lower-middle  Upper middle  High  Total 
Brazil  18  41  41  100 
China  38  14  48  100 
India  27  14  59  100 
Russia  42  28  30  100 
World  21  15  43  100 







 Table 8 Estimation results for the determinants of Chinese outward FDI in manufacturing sectors 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
  FDI_MAN  FDI_MAN_HIGH  FDI_MAN_OECD  FDI_MAN_MIDUP  FDI_MAN_LOWER  FDI_production 
GDP  0.100**  0.291***  0.400***  0.664  -0.189  -0.0321 
  (0.0505)  (0.0871)  (0.0971)  (0.502)  (0.142)  (0.0489) 
IMP  -0.0156  -0.0506  -0.0413  -0.0779  -0.00406  -0.0194* 
  (0.0117)  (0.0372)  (0.0476)  (0.0568)  (0.0165)  (0.0112) 
EXP  0.0983***  0.128***  0.118**  0.210***  0.106***  0.0823*** 
  (0.0120)  (0.0370)  (0.0471)  (0.0669)  (0.0172)  (0.0109) 
DIST  0.0629  -0.294  0.238  2.944*  -0.0208  0.209* 
  (0.123)  (0.213)  (0.236)  (1.518)  (0.344)  (0.125) 
FUELEX  -0.00950***  0.00522  -0.0156  -0.0630  -0.0124  -0.00494 
  (0.00335)  (0.00694)  (0.0141)  (0.0506)  (0.00778)  (0.00329) 
ORMETEX  -0.00490  -0.0328  -0.0188  -0.0506  -0.00922  -0.00190 
  (0.00609)  (0.0254)  (0.0298)  (0.0530)  (0.0124)  (0.00600) 
R&D  -0.151  0.0486  0.866*  -1.877  -1.430  -0.542** 
  (0.216)  (0.346)  (0.448)  (1.854)  (0.892)  (0.216) 
SEC_EDU  0.00392  0.0118*  0.0235***  0.0788**  0.00317  0.00578 
  (0.00358)  (0.00648)  (0.00751)  (0.0380)  (0.00993)  (0.00363) 
INFL  0.0289*  -0.0264  -0.0275  0.0415  0.0269  0.00686 
  (0.0168)  (0.0524)  (0.0699)  (0.0664)  (0.0227)  (0.0150) 
CORR  -0.0949  0.666***  0.215  -1.579  -1.524***  -0.521*** 
  (0.128)  (0.210)  (0.219)  (1.114)  (0.494)  (0.131) 
TEL  -0.000990  0.0212*  0.0187  -0.0563  -0.0127  -0.00267 
  (0.00700)  (0.0116)  (0.0134)  (0.0553)  (0.0194)  (0.00704) 
Constant  -4.310***  -9.740***  -18.72***  -54.45**  2.412  -2.192 
  (1.434)  (2.421)  (3.047)  (23.32)  (4.259)  (1.419) 
             
Observations  613  613  613  613  613  613 
Number of 
panel  89  89  89  89  89  89 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
Note: Probit random effects panel model. In the first column, the dependent variable is a dummy recording the value of 1 if China has invested in one of the j sectors 
in manufacturing and 0 otherwise. In the successive columns, the dependent variable is a dummy recording the value of 1 if China has invested in one of the j 
sectors in the manufacturing industry and  in the specified group of countries, and 0 otherwise  37 
 
 
Table 9 Estimation results for the determinants of Chinese outward FDI in the resource sectors 
   (I)  (II)  (III) 
  FDI_RES  FDI_RES_HIGH  FDI_RES_LOWER 
           
GDP  -0.268***  0.403  -0.327*** 
  (0.0692)  (0.281)  (0.0925) 
IMP  0.0784***  0.123**  0.0598*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0491)  (0.0123) 
EXP  -0.0652***  -0.0813*  -0.0529*** 
  (0.0108)  (0.0442)  (0.0115) 
DIST  0.185  -0.231  0.264 
  (0.158)  (0.587)  (0.209) 
FUELEX  0.00999**  0.0295*  -0.000528 
  (0.00393)  (0.0161)  (0.00487) 
ORMETEX  0.00895  0.0380  0.00364 
  (0.00647)  (0.0309)  (0.00749) 
R&D  0.236  -1.209  -5.898 
  (0.295)  (1.102)  (29,508) 
SEC_EDU  -0.00247  -0.00475  0.00729 
  (0.00428)  (0.0107)  (0.00657) 
INFL  -0.0167  -0.146  -0.0498** 
  (0.0191)  (0.158)  (0.0241) 
CORR  -0.0865  1.819*  -1.193*** 
  (0.164)  (0.929)  (0.400) 
TEL  -0.00171  0.00170  -0.0291* 
  (0.00999)  (0.0298)  (0.0175) 
Constant  3.950**  -13.59*  4.316* 
  (1.878)  (8.126)  (2.614) 
       
Observations  613  613  613 
Number of 
panel  89  89  89 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
   
Note: Probit random effects panel model. In the first column, the dependent variable is a dummy 
recording the value of 1 if China has invested in one of the j sectors in the resource intensive industry 
and 0 otherwise. In the successive columns, the dependent variable is a dummy recording the value of 
1 if China has invested in one of the j sectors in the resources and in the specified group of countries, 
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Table 10 Estimation results for the determinants of Chinese outward FDI in service sectors 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII) 
  FDI_SER  FDI_SER_HIGH  FDI_SER_OECD  FDI_SER_MIDUP  FDI_SER_LOWER  FDI_trade_services  FDI_other_services 
                       
GDP  0.0716  -0.195**  -0.0234  0.0776  0.294**  0.0802  0.0751 
  (0.0563)  (0.0850)  (0.131)  (0.261)  (0.130)  (0.0490)  (0.0484) 
IMP  -0.0677***  -0.0940***  -0.182***  -0.0663**  -0.0780***  -0.0140  -0.0230* 
  (0.0103)  (0.0299)  (0.0497)  (0.0260)  (0.0165)  (0.0118)  (0.0118) 
EXP  -0.0177*  0.0139  0.0936**  -0.0179  -0.0137  0.0228**  -0.0128 
  (0.00930)  (0.0280)  (0.0459)  (0.0231)  (0.0130)  (0.0114)  (0.0112) 
DIST  -0.257*  -0.460**  0.167  1.018  -0.205  -0.162  -0.169 
  (0.139)  (0.213)  (0.319)  (0.811)  (0.320)  (0.120)  (0.116) 
FUELEX  0.00125  0.00612  -0.000327  -0.00668  -0.000504  0.00223  -0.00130 
  (0.00353)  (0.00771)  (0.0121)  (0.0156)  (0.00654)  (0.00372)  (0.00370) 
ORMETEX  -0.00783  -0.0321  -0.00110  -0.0212  0.00491  0.00732  -0.0153* 
  (0.00695)  (0.0257)  (0.0375)  (0.0340)  (0.0114)  (0.00700)  (0.00887) 
R&D  0.0295  1.017***  2.610***  -1.271  -7.367  0.171  0.367* 
  (0.253)  (0.372)  (0.697)  (1.472)  (599.9)  (0.207)  (0.216) 
SEC_EDU  0.000522  0.00707  0.0234**  0.0346  0.00932  0.000913  -0.00383 
  (0.00395)  (0.00633)  (0.00958)  (0.0229)  (0.00931)  (0.00357)  (0.00362) 
INFL  -0.00801  -0.160***  -0.271***  -0.0207  0.00559  -0.0430*  0.00237 
  (0.0160)  (0.0543)  (0.105)  (0.0463)  (0.0208)  (0.0234)  (0.0159) 
CORR  0.237  0.144  -0.567*  -0.0691  -0.837*  0.147  0.411*** 
  (0.148)  (0.184)  (0.312)  (0.775)  (0.445)  (0.128)  (0.126) 
TEL  -0.000792  0.0490***  0.0683***  -0.0320  -0.0451**  0.00711  -0.00688 
  (0.00823)  (0.0124)  (0.0218)  (0.0410)  (0.0221)  (0.00661)  (0.00701) 
Costant  0.719  6.091**  -7.311*  -16.01*  -6.783*  -1.922  -0.702 
  (1.682)  (2.408)  (4.076)  (9.681)  (3.937)  (1.505)  (1.404) 
               
Observations  613  613  613  613  613  613  613 
Number of 
panel  89  89  89  89  89  89  89 
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
Note: Probit random effects panel model. In the first column, the dependent variable is a dummy recording the value of 1 if China has invested in one of the j 
sectors in the services and 0 otherwise. In the successive columns, the dependent variable is a dummy recording the value of 1 if China has invested in one of 
the j sectors in the services and in the specified group of countries, and 0 otherwise.   39 
 
Table 11 Summary of the main results by sector group 
MOTIVATION/SECTOR  MANUFACTURING  NATURAL RESOURCES  SERVICES 
MARKET SIZE (GDP) 
Chinese FDI are attracted by large 
markets in high income countries 
Market size reduces the probability to 
receive FDI  No clear pattern 
TRADE (Exports & Imports) 
FDI are a support for exports  FDI tends to internalize natural resources 
otherwise imported. 
FDI in services support exports by 
establishing trade related services 
NATURAL RESOURCES (Fuels & 
Metals) 
Not a relevant motivation  Fuel endowments have a positive impact 
on FDI   Not a relevant motivation 
STRATEGIC ASSETS (R&D; Human 
Capital) 
In OECD FDI are attracted by R&D and 
human capital level  Not a relevant motivation 
In OECD countries FDI are 
attracted by R&Dand human 
capital level 
RISK AVERSION (Corruption; 
Inflation) 
In low income countries FDI are not 
affected by the level of corruption. 
Inflation is not significant. 
In low income countries FDI are not 
affected by the level of corruption 
In low income countries FDI are 




Endowments of infrastructures increase 
the probability to receive FDI in high 
income countries 
Not a relevant motivation 
Endowments of infrastructures 
increase the probability to receive 
FDI In high income countries 
 
 
 